Relativism, by Maria Baghramian and Annalisa Coliva (authors-meet-critics, Truth 20|21)
Recorded on July 22, 2021, at 15:00 UTC
Relativism (Routledge, 2020).
Authors: Maria Baghramian and Annalisa Coliva. Note: Maria Baghramian was unofrtunately unable to be at the event. Annalisa Coliva delivered comments on behalf of both authors.
Critics: Max Kölbel, Eduardo Pérez-Navarro, Paul Boghossian, and John MacFarlane (University of California Berkeley).
Session abstracts:
Maria Baghramian and Annalisa Coliva: Relativism, an ancient philosophical doctrine, is once again a topic of heated debate. In this book, Maria Baghramian and Annalisa Coliva present the recent arguments for and against various forms of relativism. The first two chapters introduce the conceptual and historical contours of relativism. These are followed by critical investigations of relativism about truth, conceptual relativism, epistemic relativism, and moral relativism. The concluding chapter asks whether it is possible to make sense of relativism as a philosophical thesis. The book introduces readers to the main types of relativism and the arguments in their favor. It also goes beyond the expository material to engage in more detailed critical responses to the key positions and authors under discussion. Including chapter summaries, suggestions for further reading, and a glossary, Relativism is essential reading for students of philosophy as well as those in related disciplines where relativism is studied, such as anthropology, sociology, and politics.
Max Kölbel: I shall be responding to four objections against my own truth-relativism that Maria Baghramian and Annalisa Coliva raise in their book: (i) that my view is not capable of capturing the sense that there is disagreement in purported cases of faultless disagreement; (ii) that it generates incorrect predictions about when people do or don’t engage in disputes; (iii) that it makes false claims about competence and (iv) that it does not have the resources to explain retraction. Except for objection (iii), where I concede the main point, I show that the objections fail.
Eduardo Pérez-Navarro: I remain unconvinced by some of the book’s arguments against relativism, and part of the reason stems from my disagreement with Baghramian and Coliva’s characterization of the view. In particular, I do not think relativism should be committed to Equal Validity, and will in fact argue that the latter is incompatible with Non-neutrality, which I think relativism should not renounce. Now, Baghramian and Coliva might say that, if relativism does not imply Equal Validity, it will be unable to account for the faultlessness of faultless disagreement, as doing so requires accepting Equal Validity. In response to this, I will also argue that we can have faultless disagreement without Equal Validity.
Paul Boghossian: Baghramian and Coliva develop an interesting argument against Harman’s (and other’s) constructivist/relativist view of morality. They claim that such a view could not be correct because the conditions needed for morality to have been established conventionally cannot obtain. This is an original argument, full of interesting philosophical issues, although one that can be ultimately resisted.
John MacFarlane: Baghramian and Coliva have correctly identified the crux of the problem facing truth relativists: reconciling the idea that two parties to a dispute genuinely disagree, with the idea that their standpoints are equally valid and their judgments equally correct (in some sense). They argue that the moves I make to secure disagreement make me unable to secure equal validity. I explain how my view works and how it can resist their criticisms.
The TRUTH 20|21 Conference is hosted the Virtual International Consortium of Truth Research (VICTR), sponsored by the Future of Truth project at the University of Connecticut Humanities Institute (https://futureoftruth.uconn.edu/). Information on upcoming VICTR events can be found at https://tinyurl.com/VICTR.
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