Truth and the Tractatus (Truth 20|21 Conference)
Recorded on 29 July 2021, at 16:00 UTC.
In celebration of the centenary of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, this session features a series of paper presentations examining truth in the context of Wittgenstein’s early work. Presentations from Hans-Johan Glock (University of Zurich), Juliet Floyd (Boston University), and Jose Zalabardo (University College London).
Judgment and Truth in the Early Wittgenstein
Hans-Johann Glock
Three themes run through this paper. First, the need to understand Wittgenstein’s early discussions of judgement and truth as part of his account of intentionality, this account being nothing other than the famous picture theory. The second theme is an important aspect of that account, which I call the ‘antecedence of sense’. Sense (aka a particular notion of sentence meaning) antecedes or is logically prior to both judgement and truth. Without sense, there is nothing to judge or assert, and hence nothing to be either true or false. The third theme is that this antecedence of sense holds the key to understanding the notion of truth. I criticize standard interpretations of the Tractatus account of truth for ignoring this antecedence. I take issue both with the standard view that the Tractatus contains a correspondence theory and, to a lesser extent, with recent suggestions that it propounds a deflationary or semantic theory. Wittgenstein’s ‘obtainment’ theory of truth combines a semantic explanation of the relation between a sentence and what it says with a deflationary account of the agreement between what the sentence says and what obtains or is the case if it is true.
The Tractatus on Semantic Unity
Jose Zalabardo
Abstract: I argue that Wittgenstein’s picture theory is his solution to the problem of linguistic unity, as he encountered it in Russell’s multiple-relation theory of judgment.
Truth in Early Wittgenstein and Gödel
Juliet Floyd, Boston University
The Tractatus engages directly with both Frege and Russell on the nature of truth, developing responses to each, particularly to Frege’s view that true thoughts have a common objectual referent, “The True”, and Russell’s view that true belief may be analyzed in terms of external relations of greater than 2-adicity. Schlick explicitly rejected Russell’s “multiple relation” view in favor of a form of correspondence theory, one which, however, easily tipped into forms of conventionalism and verificationism. Quite differently, Wittgenstein’s picture conception draws in two further ideas: a medium of representation and the idea of modality as fundamental to logic.
Aware of the Tractatus, Gödel engaged with Russell’s theory of truth, particularly in the period leading up to his incompleteness paper (1929-1931), his work in set theory (1932-34) and again in 1942-3. The parallel yet distinct engagements of Gödel and Wittgenstein with Russell on truth (and Vienna positivism and the Tractatus itself) are fascinating. Each regarded Russell’s view as requiring amendment, but whereas Gödel focused on the need for an actual infinite for the foundations of mathematics, and a metaphysical and phenomenological basis for the extensionalism this requires, Wittgenstein articulated, from the Tractatus onward, a non-extensional view of the foundations of mathematics. Wittgenstein highlighted step-by-step, “mechanical”, purely “formal” procedures as a central aspect of proof in mathematics, sharply separating this from the extensional point of view. In the end, Wittgenstein and Gödel both took Turing’s analysis of the notion of a formal system (1936) to clinch the proof aspect. They drew different but comparable dialectical philosophical morals about the notion of truth from this.
The TRUTH 20|21 Conference is hosted the Virtual International Consortium of Truth Research (VICTR), sponsored by the Future of Truth project at the University of Connecticut Humanities Institute (https://futureoftruth.uconn.edu/). Information on upcoming VICTR events can be found at https://tinyurl.com/VICTR.
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